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Dragalevtsy. In general, though the division of labor was traditional, the specialization of occupation was increasing. Though unemployment was absent from the village, this in no way implied that all had the kind of work they wanted. It was astounding enough that even in times of world depression all did have a way of earning a living. 464

In Bulgaria, as in most countries, property passed from parent to child. There too the laws governing this transfer were very complicated. However, as a general principle in the villages sons inherited twice as much land as daughters. Usually the sons received equal amounts, but a father while still alive could divide the land, taking an equal share for himself, which he later gave to his favorite son. Quite often a sister said when the time of division arrived: "Why should I take land away from my brothers?" and forfeited her claim. In some cases she would sell her share of the estate cheaply to a favorite brother. If she was married, however, her husband could insist that she take what was her due and might even go to court to pursue the case. Every year there were a few Dragalevtsy people involved in long-drawn-out lawsuits originating over the division of inherited land. More often than not, lawyers' fees used up a great part of the value of the property. 428 593 [691]

A heavy inheritance tax accompanied any such transfer of property from the father to his children. One man at work in the hayfield took time off to tell me of the arrangement being worked out in his family: 428 651

"Our father, who is still living, told us three brothers to divide his property equally among us. We have not made the division officially as yet, because if we did we would have to pay an inheritance tax amounting to about four hundred dollars. We divide the land by lot. We take strips of land, both meadows and fields of equal value, and draw lots for the strips. Of course, our father has kept some of the land for himself, but we shall divide that among the three of us after his death."

The most serious conflicts in the village arose when there was disagreement over the division of a patrimony. Brother turned against brother, and whole families became involved in the dispute. There 428 578

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623 practice price-fixing, standardization of products, and the like. The
441 representative appointed by the merchants was Ivan Katsarov, previ-
241 ously mentioned as a manager of one of the village taverns who appeared as a plaintiff in court. Furthermore, the farmers had to organize themselves into an association called a zadruga (which had no connection with the old form of joint family known by that name). Such organizations followed the Italian system of corporations under the Fascist regime and insured representation in government on the basis of occupation rather than political preference. These agricultural zadrugas worked well in theory around the council tables in Sofia, but met with resistance in the village. In the opinion of many leaders of co-operatives, the zadrugas ran counter to the strong co-operative movement which had already made such headway in Bulgaria. Their critics point out they not only struck at the very foundation of this movement, but also had the fault of being handed down from above instead of springing from natural needs in the village itself.

623 Should there have been a number of industrial laborers in the village they too would have had an ex officio member on the council. The presence of the other ex officio members on the council was easily understood. The doctors, the school director, and the mayor were expected by the national authorities to take an active part in deciding the policies of the village government. Such a council, in spite of the great furor connected with its formation, was still an advisory rather than a governing body.

In order to get a better understanding of the way government affected the life of the individual peasant, I sought answers to several questions.

651 *How were the taxes paid?* On February 25, July 25, and October 25, people were supposed to come to the *Obshtina* and pay taxes. Those who did not show up were summoned by the courier. If this summons went unheeded, the individuals were sent red notices reminding them that they had to pay within three or four days. If they failed to do this, the *Sekretar Birnik* made out a list of their possessions for a public sale which was held if the taxes remained unpaid. There had been several instances where goods were actually sold for failure to pay taxes, much to the shame of the people involved.

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When I pressed him for his reasons, fully expecting him to say that he was yielding to the pressure of his wife or public opinion, he gravely replied: 527 178 183

"You see in Sofia I did not own any of my own cloth but now I have a great deal downstairs which I must protect from the mice." I might mention in passing that Bai Yurdan had become a faithful member of the Communist party.

The wolf holidays were still observed for three days following the Day of the Archangel Michael, which comes on November 21. During these days the peasants were careful to do no work and refused to cook or boil anything. Such rigid observances, they believed, protected their sheep from wolves, which were still numerous upon the mountain.

One event of overshadowing importance in the changes which had occurred in Dragalevtsy since 1937 had been its incorporation in Greater Sofia in 1939. Even though their village was close to Sofia, Dragalevtsy people had always considered themselves quite apart, and looked upon Sofia ways as alien ways. However, Sofia politicians managed to bring the village under the sway of the city's municipality. Most villagers considered this an evil day in the history of their community and could cite a number of disadvantages which had occurred as a result. One of the village officials, whom I had known previously, complained particularly about the following points: 369 178 186

1. The city municipality had taken over the forests.

2. It had taken over the meadows which the peasants owned in common. For instance, the villagers no longer did the haying in the meadows which used to belong to the school because all of the revenue from the sale of this hay went to the Sofia School Fund. This meant that the three Dog Days,[1] described in an earlier chapter, were once more days of idleness.

3. Formerly the Dragalevtsy Obshtina collected seven or eight million leva in taxes, but since incorporation with Sofia had only a budget of one million on which to operate. My informant failed to mention that much of this money came from the factory district down on the Sofia plain which had once, much to the dissatisfaction of the [651]

[1] [Cf. p. 58, category III -- Analyst]

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[651] 178 369 people living in the district, been a part of the village Obshtina. This area had always been referred to by the villagers as the Mahala, or Quarter.

4. Repairs in the village, such as putting a wooden bridge back into commission after a heavy storm, could be made only after the Sofia authorities gave their approval. Thus, maintenance of roads and other services in the village were said to suffer.

[759] 5. No longer did the village have its own doctor, and it had even lost, so the villagers said, all the medical equipment including microscopes and blood-testing units which the village Obshtina had once owned. Instead, a doctor came at irregular intervals to render whatever medical services were required. This loss of medical equipment, even more than the loss of the physician's services, was a hard pill for some of the more active village leaders to swallow.

6. In place of the veterinarian, who formerly lived in the village, one came twice a week to examine animals and to see that the various veterinary regulations were observed.

But whether they liked it or not, the Dragalevtsy people were a part of Sofia, even to the extent of being included in the city's wartime rationing system. The old rural-urban differences persisted, reminding Americans of similar situations in the United States where the businessman's daylight saving time was anathema to the farmer.

159 585 As I tried to reconstruct the chief occurrences of the years intervening between my departure in 1937 and the end of the war, I inquired often as to the whereabouts of some members of the intelligentsia whom I had known well. I learned that the mayor, who had been so helpful during my earlier visit, had given up his post during the days of German collaboration. Apparently he had disagreed with the local committee as to procedures and amounts of grain to be requisitioned from the peasants. He had already been suffering from ill health and could no longer stand the pressure of troubles, arguments, and dissatisfactions which each day brought to his office. From Dragalevtsy my mayor friend had been transferred to the picturesque village of Panchevo, which I shall long remember because of the lunch I had there one summer's day many years ago.

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APPENDIX II

A NOTE ON TAXES (1937)

An item of great expense to the peasant is taxes. The taxes may be divided into two kinds, State taxes and *Obshtina* (local) taxes. 651

Some of the taxes collected by the State are:

1. An occupation tax, which does not apply to agriculturalists, but to grocers, tavern keepers, milkmen, and teamsters.
2. An income tax on incomes of eighty thousand *leva* (pensions excluded). This tax varies proportionately from two to thirty-six per cent.
3. A construction tax. If a house or building costs 100,000 *leva*, a three per cent tax of its value must be paid after the building is finished.
4. A sales tax on many industrial products which the peasants have to buy.
5. A wagon tax. 25 *leva* annually if the wagon is for home use; 150 to 250 *leva* annually if the wagon is for business use.
6. A road tax. 140 *leva* minimum, with a graduated tax on higher incomes.
7. A railroad tax. 30 *leva* a year if not near a railroad. 90 *leva* a year if near a railroad under repair, which happens to be the case with Dragalevtsy.
8. A school tax for students from the fourth class to the eighth class, which does not affect the Dragalevtsy school (only to the fourth class).

Various local taxes:

1. A land ownership tax. 3½ *leva* per decare (14 *leva* an acre).
2. A land value tax. The village land is divided into first, second, and third categories, and is assessed as follows:

   8 *leva* per decare for the first category
   6 *leva* per decare for the second category
   4 *leva* per decare for the third category

3. A tax on buildings. An assessment is made at the rate of 2½ *leva* for each 1,000 *leva* of value.
4. A pasturage tax of 15 *leva* a year for each work animal.
5. A tax for livestock fund. 15 *leva* per head per year. This covers the cost of keeping a village bull and accumulates a fund for erecting a village barn later on.
6. A wood tax. 20 *leva* per cubic meter if purchased from the government.

cost of living and therefore to handicap them in their efforts to lower their costs of production, 433

One of the reasons given for establishing native industries is that in case of war, a country would find itself less dependent on foreign supplies, but in the case of Bulgaria even this plea can not be maintained, for not only is Bulgaria disarmed and not likely to be drawn into a war by herself, but her industry is almost entirely dependent for its raw materials, and largely for its driving power (oil) on foreign supplies and would come to a standstill in case of war breaking out.

Naturally the extreme protectionism adopted by successive Bulgarian governments elicited very strong protests from the masses and these were voiced by their representatives in the Sobranye, but without avail, for most political groups did their utmost to further the interests of the industrialists who knew how to win over to their cause influential politicians. 433 651●

A crushing indictment of this protectionist policy is contained in a most lucid and interesting booklet, written by T. P. Karatsorov in 1932, who has no difficulty in proving to the hilt his contention fortified by statistical data, that protectionism has had on Bulgarian economy ruinous consequences, and in his concluding remarks he adds that it has equally proved morally disastrous among governing circles. He cites in support the case of a prominent politician who in 1931 declared: "These parasitic industries are a terrible evil. Our industry is unduly favoured at the expense of our national economy", and who, on becoming a Cabinet Minister did not hesitate to affirm a month later: "Our industry is not yet sufficiently protected, the State must make further sacrifices for it." This complete *volte-face* being obviously due to the bribes which he received in the meantime while his former declaration may be assumed to have been an attempt to blackmail industrialists.

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The local industry enjoys on the whole a tariff protection of 100% to over 200% against imported foreign goods. Raw materials utilised in the local industry were liable to an ad *valorem* duty of 3%, increased to 8% in 1931 on their entry. The loss to the State accruing from applying this extremely reduced import duty, instead of the full tariff had gradually increased to as much as 450 million leva in 1929 and had surpassed 500 millions in 1930.

M. Karatsorov gives many examples of the parasitic industries which have been fostered in Bulgaria. The details relative to one will amply suffice to illustrate all and sundry. Thus five workshops were established to manufasture nails from imported steel wire. The total annual consumption of nails in Bulgaria is 5 to 6 million kg, the import duty 7 to 8 leva per kg.. or about 150% of the cost of foreign nails f. o. b. a Bulgarian port. (about 4.50 leva per kg.) The price of the local article was, on an average above 10 leva a kg., so that the profit realised by the local makers was at least 120%. The number of workmen employed was 200 and the amount disbursed in salaries does not exceed 3 to 4 million leva a year. The State loses 30 million leva a year, through levying a duty of 8% on wire, instead of a duty of 150% on 5 to 6 million kg. of nails, and except for the wages paid to the workmen all this sum of some 26 million leva, is divided among the owners of the 5 workshops, and is obviously provided out of the pockets of the population. This was so self-evident that deputy, I. Kurtev, intervened in the Sobranye on April 5,1928 and demanded: "That this industry be withdrawn from the list of those which are being favoured", but in vain. An example of how a high tariff barrier encourages the building up of redundant manufacturing plant is furnished by the sheet-glass industry. The consumption of this article amounts to 80,000 cases a year. F. o. b. prices of Belgian glass were 260

leva per case, and the duty 600 leva per case. As the cost of erecting a glass factory was computed at 30 million leva, and the profit to be realised by the non-payment of duty on the locally manufactured sheet-glass was 48,000,000 leva (80,000 cases×600 leva) and would have permitted a profit of 150% to be made during the opening year, work on three different factories was begun in 1930. The creation of such industries, as M. Karatsorov shows, would even have an adverse influence on the country's balance of payments. Thus if 80,000 cases of sheet-glass were imported, currency to the amount of 20 million leva would be exported, while when the factories would begin operating, the owners being foreigners, the amount of currency which would be exported would be equal to the sum of 48 millions of profit made minus the local expenses of the factories. 433 651

M. Karatsorov affirms that in most cases the creation of local industries has increased adversely the country's balance of payments, and he cites in support not only the above instance, but also that of the sugar industry and also the textile. Local textile weaving sheds often paying more for their imported yarn than what would have been paid if the corresponding woven fabric had been imported instead from a country the industry of which had been thoroughly modernised and was producing on a large scale like Japan.

The opinions of the above writer were often re-echoed and punctuated by such remarks as these in the Sobranye. "The law fostering industry has cost two milliard leva which the people had to find". (Dr I. Karadjov. March 26. 1926). "By purchasing materials and machinery abroad the loss to the national economy will be as great as if foreign goods were bought, and besides, protection will give free play to speculation". (G. Zivkov, April 3 1926). "The parasitic industries live on the back of the people, who

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are robbed in order that 1200 to 2000 industrialists and their bankers may profit" (S. Petkov, May 12 1932). "The loss to the revenue through exempting from duty raw materials is 500 million leva a year; these privileges must be put a stop to" (G. Zeliabov, June 8, 1932).

This system of importing semi-manufactured materials practically free, in order to convert them into manufactured articles in Bulgaria, also led to grave abuses. Several unscrupulous manufacturers imported materials and often sold the greatest portion of them secretly. Thus S. Stefanov, subsequently Minister of Finance, declared in the Sobranye on Dec. 8 1927. "Big frauds are committed by pseudo-industrialists who dispose on the market of materials imported duty free for use in their factories. In big factories control is possible but the 800 workshops set up since the war are never inspected. A huge army of inspectors is needed to supervise 1100 industrial establishments and there are only 4 or 5 inspectors affected to this job." Another deputy, S. Boyadjiev, dwelt on the following day on the same abuses, cited instances, and then made the following just criticism: "The law grants to any seven persons the privilege to form a co-operative society. There are several persons who have thus grouped themselves together, and who import materials duty free for alleged industrial purposes, and then sell them secretly, undercutting honest traders who have paid the legal duty on their stuff." Another trenchant attack on protectionism was delivered by deputy K. Manolov on Dec. 15, 1927, who among other things stated: "Experts affirm that the subsidies granted to industry up to the present date amount to 4000 million leva. Is this justified? It should have cheapened the cost of living but the contrary has taken place and foreign articles, inspite of the duty, still compete with the locally manufactured ones. Our balance of payments has not improved, and

our industry is hardly any stronger. Even labour has not been advantaged. In 1909, a workman was paid two gold leva a day, equal to 54 paper leva, and to day he only receives 47 leva. We should not go on dissipating our vital forces in this way or we shall degenerate as a nation... The financial cartel which controls most industries enjoys the sympathies of government circles etc".

How the community was exploited in order that a few favoured individuals might amass wealth is also clearly described in the party organ of the Radical party in its issue of Feb 20 1931: "According to the information we possess the Granitoid Cement Manufacturing Co. Has realised for the year 1930 a profit of 180 million leva, a sum which considerably exceeds the capital invested in this concern. How are such profits possible at this time of crisis? This is quite plain. A ton of cement costs 500 to 600 leva, but the duty on it is 800 leva. Consequently foreign cement can not be sold on our market for less than 1450 leva a ton, and this has permitted the Granitoid to sell its locally made cement at about this figure, realising a premium of about 800 leva a ton, Is it not outright robbery to mulct people out of their savings in order that this company might make a profit of 145%, instead of contenting itself with a benefit of 12% to 15%? Cement is an article of prime necessity, both the State and the public buy large quantites of if. Until when will this criminal policy continue?"

These details seem fully to confirm M. V. Novicov's pronouncement on protection, namely: "Tout industriel protégé est un parasite. Et chose étrange, tandis qu'on considere le parasitisme comme un mal, les gouvernements considèrent jusqu'à présent le parasitisme provenant de la protection comme un bien... Un tarif protecteur, n'est autre chose que le gaspillage économique érigé en système de gouvernement. Il a la prétention

000 d'enrichir la société, il n'a d'autre résultat, en réalité, que d'arrêter le developpement de la richesse. Le système protecteur c'est une récompense donnée à l'imbecillité, au desordre, à l'incurie, et une punition infligée à la capacité, à l'économie, à l'intelligence." ("Luttes entre sociétés humaines" p. 117/8). They also fully support Mr J. A. Hobson's affirmation in his "The New Protection" p. 113–7 that: "Protection is a crime for its effect as its intention is to perpetuate strife by stamping divisions ... whereas the whole trend of civilisation has been to bind the peoples of the world into closer unity of interests and activities by the growing of interpendence of commerce, protection would reverse the movement .. Cobden was mistaken in thinking that the perception of their obvious self-interest must rapidly lead all nations to adopt Free Trade. His error lay in failing to perceive that, though the interest of each people as a whole lay in freedom of commerce, the interests of special groups of traders or producers within each country would continue to lie along the line of privilege and protection, and that until democracy became a political reality these organised group interests might continue to mould the fiscal policy of their several States".

• 651 435 In fact protectionism in Bulgaria has contributed in intensifying the existing antagonism between the rural and urban classes, the former bitterly complaining that they were being exploited in favour of the latter. If they were unable to make themselves heard it was because "democracy had not become a political reality" and that "organised group interests" in league with the political flunkeys who bossed Bulgaria, "continued to mould the fiscal policy of the State".

The recriminations of the peasantry were fully justified for if the prices ruling in 1929 be taken as a basis (100) those of agricultural products had sunk to the level

of 34.4 at the beginning of 1934, while those of locally manufactured articles had only been reduced to 88.1, and those of imported industrial goods to 81.8, mainly on account of the high protective duties which remained constant owing to the specific tariff in force.

As the above figures are based on wholesale prices, it may be assumed that the peasants had to pay 10% to 15% more for their purchases from retail stores, and that they had to give 2 ½ times as much of their produce as they were accustomed in order to obtain in exchange the manufactured articles they had been used to buy.

The discrepancy between agricultural and manufactured goods has to some extent been reduced since the abrogation of the parliamentary regime, for the military seem to have had a clearer conception of their duties as rulers. This they achieved by drastically curtailing the privileges enjoyed by local manufacturers on the one hand, and by the State intervening as buyer of several agricultural articles, such as wheat, rye, cotton, rice, tobacco etc, and fixing enhanced prices for them. The government attaching less value to the cheapness at which the consuming public might obtain its food than to the maintenance of a level of prices at which the peasants are able to live. This seems to forebode a return to sanity, for level-headed men like Prof. G. P. Ghenov, often laid stress on the necessity of Bulgaria reducing her tariffs if she were not to see foreign markets closed to her produce, and that it was indispensable to buy if she sought to sell. His speech of May 16 1932 in the Sobranye in which he exposed the inanity of subsidising an industrial system which cost one milliard leva annually to the State, was very favourably commented on at the time.

What seems difficult to explain is how the wiseacres of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations should, on the floating of the Stabilisation loan of 1928

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have granted Bulgaria a free hand to raise her tariff, on the pretext that this step would increase the revenues earmarked for the service of this loan, a prognostication which was radically contradicted by subsequent events since the increase of the tariff which followed in 1930, imparted a further impetus to the creation of local industries, reduced imports and diminished very considerably the custom dues raised from them. But the Financial Committee was not so obtuse as it would appear at first sight. Its secret desire was not to strengthen either the position of the bondholders, or that of Bulgaria, but rather to grant increased facilities to certain financial interests for exploiting the Bulgarian consumer through the dominant position these occupy in industial, banking and commercial enterprises, and which position they hitherto managed to exploit to the full owing to the venality and flunkeyism of the politicians, who did not hesitate to sell themselves to these occult influences. According to the bulletin of the National Bank of Bulgaria of Jan. 1935, the total fully paid up capital of industrial limited companies during 1934 was 3,202.4 million leva, of which 1631.3 millions were foreign, so that it is obvious that protection favoured more foreign interests than Bulgarian, and explains why the Financial Committee was so prodigal in extending to Bulgaria the right to increase its tariff. The participation of foreign capital can only be traced in limited companies, and the above mentioned bulletin specified that 325.9 millions of foreign capital were invested in banking establishments, 281.3 in commercial, 11 in transport enterprises, and 30.7 in insurance companies. No particulars are obtainable about the foreign capital in private firms, but it must be as much, if not more, for deputy C. Petkov affirmed in the Sobranye on Feb. 26, 1932, that annually as much as 650 million leva are remitted abroad as interest on foreign capital invested in Bulgaria, and 800 millions as its par-

ticipation in profits. These figures are not likely to be far out since another deputy, M. Dotchev, stated on March 4 1932, that during the financial year 1928/9, over one milliard leva was remitted abroad as dividends and profits of the foreign capital invested in industrial and commercial enterprises in Bulgaria.

Some preliminary statistics have been published as to the state of industry in 1930/1, but most of these figures refer to those workshops which enjoy privileges extended to them by the law fostering industry, and are necessarily incomplete. These establishments numbered 1250, had a capital of 7500 million leva, used 115,000 H. P., employed 36,000 workmen (the total number of workpeople employed in all industries fluctuates round about 75,000) and had an annual output of 6850 million leva of manufactured goods. The principal branches of industry were:

	Number of establishments	Capital in million leva	H. P. employed	workpeople employed	% of local raw materials used
Textile	214	1390·8	19,197	14,641	13·6%
(In 1933:	231	some working with 2 & even 3 shifts		17,976)	
Food & drink . .	172		27,653	4579	
Metallurgical . . .	142	417·3	10,998	4084	14%
Ceramic	110	774	22,604	3382	48%
Chemical	117	397·8	6,707	2031	35%
Leather	52	162·3	4,721	778	18%
Timber	55		2,726	1643	
Paper	4	99·3	2,210	443	38%

There are two other important groups of industries not included in the above table, the tobacco manipulating and cigarette manufacturing in which some 20,000 workpeople are almost permanently employed and the milling industry. In the latter, a capital of 786.[3] million leva is invested. There are 307 flour mills, employing 2579 workpeople and possessing machinery developing 21,637 H. P. This was a thriving industry in the past as deputy

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of the reorganisation of agriculture in Bulgaria is a most pressing one if a social upheaval is to be avoided at no distant date. 241 434

Prof. Tsolakov has carefully calculated the revenue of all items of income of farmers from the various cereals, vegetables, fruit, poultry, cattle etc. they raise, as well as the disbursements they make for the purchase of similar articles for their personal requirements in cases where they do not produce one, or several of these articles on their own farms and have to sell certain surpluses, if they have such, in order to buy what they do not produce, and he has come to the conclusion that farmers possessing up to 2 hectares have an annual deficit as regards their needs in agricultural produce of 4,226 leva per farmstead, those possessing 2 to 5 hectares have a surplus of 402 leva, those with 5 to 10 hectares a surplus of 7,103, those with 10 to 15 hectares a surplus of 15,632, and those of over 15 hectares a surplus of 19,919. However, the rural population has other needs besides agricultural produce, which mainly represents food, namely: clothing, light, fuel, etc., and if these requirements be taken into consideration the farmsteads would show the following position as to revenue and expenditure:

Farmsteads up to 2 hectares:	Annual deficit	7,226	leva
" from 2 to 5	"	"	"	4,598	"
" " 5 to 10	"	"	surplus	103	"
" " 10 to 15	"	"	"	5,632	"
" of over 15	"	"	"	6,919	"

As a consequence, farmers have been unable to pay their taxes, or to refund their debts. Prof Tsolakov has appended the results of an examination into the accounts of 487 individual farmsteads in the region of Varna, and gives these most impressive data as to the hopeless position in which the peasantry finds itself. Arrears of unpaid taxes have been accumulating for the past years, and there 241 651 426

241 is practically no prospect of their ever being met. The
•651 following figures are self-explanatory:
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Cases	Area of farmsteads	Arrears of taxes 1925—6 to 1932—3	Tax for 1933—4 (forx each category	Fines of farmsteads)	Total mount of taxes owing
144	up to 1 hectare	79,943 leva	12,016 leva	10,200 leva	102,150 leva
79	1 to 2 "	97,282 "	20,368 "	20,661 "	138,311 "
75	2 to 3 "	132,317 "	31,883 "	29,498 "	193,698 "
83	3 to 5 "	236,560 "	53,260 "	54,575 "	334,495 "
65	5 to 10 "	229,741 "	75,310 "	49,575 "	354,626 "
33	10 to 20 "	132,250 "	73,650 "	55,799 "	261,699 "
8	over 20 "	241,675 "	32,683 "	126,358 "	400,716 "

The amount of individual indebtedness has also been inquired into, and this has been computed as follows.

Farmsteads of	To Agricultural bank	To Co-operative bank	To the State (taxes mainly arrears)	To Municipality	To Private persons	Total
up to 2 hectares	7,360[1]	1,710	970	170	12,050	22,260
of 2 to 5 "	3,820	600	530	60	4,410	9,420
" 5 to 10 "	2,930	580	360	50	2,370	6,290
" 10 to 15 "	2,950	440	220	—	1,600	5,210
" over 15 "	2,800	290	400	40	1,190	4,720

From the above data it will be evident that the smaller farmers are hopelessly insolvent since the actual value of arable land is between 5,000 to 8,000 leva per hectare.

241 With regard to the production of cereals Prof. Tso-
511 lakov calculates that the average deficit of farmsteads

[1] According to a statement made in the Sobranye on Feb. 26 1932, peasant indebtedness to the Agricultural Bank amounted to 4,096,043,000 leva at the end of 1931. Farmsteads of 10 hectares owed it 3360 per hectare, and those of 10 hectares and over, 2170 leva per hectare. The total value of the 4,469,987 hectares under cultivation was estimated in 1927 at 83,933,620,000 leva, rural buildings at 34,845 millions, the live stock at 19,927,205,000 leva and agricultural inventory at 4,760,149,000 leva. By 1932 values had fallen by 60%, so that the value of farm property was estimated at only 50,000 millions and the debts of the farmers then amounted at only 12,000 millions. The total revenue from agriculture, had dwindled from 23,347 millions in 1929 to under 13,000 millions in 1930, as the Minister of Agriculture affirmed in the Sobranye on March 6. 1932.

ched 25,411,022 kg. valued at 45 million leva. Experiments have also been made with another oleaginous plant, the *Ricinus Communis*, from which castor oil is extracted, with excellent results, a yield of 1500 kg. of seed of superior quality having been obtained per hectare sown.

Tobacco has come to replace cereals in importance as an article of export. In 1934 it represented 40% of the total exports, and the quantity marketed abroad was valued at 982 million leva. In 1933, 22,531,439 kg. of a value of 1,174,511,061 leva were export. In 1934 the respective figures were 20,830,000 and 982,000,000. Prices have been very much affected by the prevailing crisis, as may be inferred by comparing the above with the figures for 1932, when 22,452,752 kg. were exported, but were priced at 2,654,238,438 leva. It was after the war that tobacco cultivation was particularly fostered, the quantity exported rising from 7,355,448 kg. in 1919 to the record figure of 33,647,241 kg. in 1925. After this date both Greece and Turkey reappeared on the world market as producers of Oriental tobacco and the proportion of Bulgarian tobacco sold abroad fell off, though on the whole it maintained its position in Germany, which buys steadily about half of the amount exported, Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia etc., where its qualities have been thoroughly appreciaded. It would appear that the average quantity of nicotine found in it varies from 0·5% to 1%, when according to Kissling, the contents in nicotine of Virginia tobacco are 4·3% to 4·8%, of Kentucky 4·5%, of Sumatra 4·1% and Samsoun (Turkey) 2·5%. German chemists have characterised Bulgarian tobacco as poor in nicotine and have approved the manifacture of cigarettes made from it which are designed as containing the "minimum of nicotine". Tobacco forms one of the chief items of revenue to the State, some 650 million leva being annually derived from the tobacco monopoly. The State also raises a tax of 1

to 2 leva per kg. of tobacco exported, while the amount of wages disbursed for the manipulation of tobacco was reckoned to reach an annual average of 559 million leva during the period 1919—1931, the number of workmen engaged in the manipulation of tobacco being 86.000. This however is a seasonable occupation and less than 20,000 workpeople are permanently engaged. The number of farmsteads mainly cultivating tobacco is reckoned at 127,000.

In contrast with tobacco, which now forms the staple product of Bulgarian agriculture, and the main source of revenue, the cultivation of sugar-beet, in which some 100,000 formsteads are mainly engaged, has caused, and is causing an important loss to the State. In Great Britain also the subsidising of the sugar industry has led to lively debates, and Sir Herbert Samuel, as recently as Feb. 5, 1935 appealed in the House of Commons that „this colossal, wasteful and scandalous expenditure should be brought to a speedy end". In a world suffering from a collective attack of aberration, all its members more or less, show the same symptoms. It is not surprising therefore that even the levelheaded Bulgarians, endowed with no little common sense, should not have managed to keep themselves exempt from the universal malady.

Under the protection of a high import duty, amounting actually to 11 leva per kg., five sugar refineries were established in Bulgaria at a cost of 1,347,226,037 leva. Their united capacity of production is annually 63 million kg, but consumption a few years ago was only half this figure, and owing to the steadily diminishing buying power of the population, this has decreased to 21.6 million kg. in 1933, for the State imposes sugar also with excise, and a communal tax and the sale price of sugar is as 26 leva per kg., while the price of sugar on the world market is under 5/-per cwt, or 2 leva per kg. It was af-